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ABSTRACT 
On its surface, the ‘smart home’ marks an effort to augment everyday domestic life to 
the benefit of its members, through the pervasive digital technologies of the Internet of 
Things (IoT). Through an analysis of the family-imitating group accounts offered by both 
Google and Amazon, as part of their smart home ecosystems, this paper identifies a 
project of constructing a new site for platform capitalism, in the form of the platform 
family, and its effort to pacify domestic life. The platform family is an engineered 
simulacra of domesticity, formatted to run on the smart home operating system, serving 
simultaneously as a vehicle for domestic consumption, and a vehicle for consuming 
domestic life. Drawing on sociology of the family, we contextualise this by showing how 
the home has long been a site of struggles between internal and external control. 
Addressing the reconfiguration of membership possibilities within the platform family, we 
show how it seeks to intervene in domestic life, by reshaping family's material 
possibilities and normativities. Looking past the technologies to the social forms they 
imbue reveals a project that is ultimately motivated by a desire to colonise the home as 
a site for platform capitalism. We conclude by highlighting the potential for resistance in 
this space and ask whether the homogenisation of domestic life attempted by these 
interventions is not fundamentally contradictory, in denying the very qualities that give 
family its value. 




The home has long been recognised as a protected space for family (Mallett, 2004). 
Nevertheless, as a site of care, socialisation, and consumption, it has drawn the 
attentions of outside institutions, attentions often met with resistance. The legacy of 
these border skirmishes can be seen today in the delicate relationship between the 
liberal state and the home. The EU’s 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a 
most contemporary legislative regime, which sets out the legal relationships between 
institutions and individuals around digital data, retains a ‘household exemption’ clause 
which leaves domestic data practices beyond its reach. 
One facet of the digital economy which prompted law makers to introduce the 
GDPR (Crabtree et al., 2016) is the emerging Internet of Things (IoT), a label applied to 
efforts to embed networked computing within everyday objects. The IoT is already 
realised in many areas of life, from joggers’ Fitbits to globe-spanning logistics which 
track goods from factory to front door. Industry projections envisage connected objects 
growing from the low billions today, to a trillion within the decade. This paper is 
concerned with the IoT within family life, and within the homes they inhabit – the ‘smart 
home’. Where the state has only carefully tread, the tech giants of Silicon Valley are 
rushing in. Amazon and Google, the vanguard of the smart home industry, now offer 
group accounts for families to manage their smart home. It is these accounts, which 
prescribe a domestic group and a series of roles within it, and which garb themselves in 
the language of both family and home, which we focus upon. In previous work, we 
explored how such technologies implicate, within domestic contexts, interpersonal 
relations (Goulden et al., 2018). Here we go a step further, to consider how the systems 
these technologies are a part of seek to capture, and in doing so remake, domestic life. 
The IoT has very different origins to the Internet it builds upon. The Internet was 
a historical accident, open and decentralised by design in order to best serve its scientific 
and military goals, an architecture that came to support the emergence of Web 2.0 and 
its peer-to-peer exchanges (Beer & Burrows, 2007). By contrast, the smart home is a 
centralised, commercial endeavour, of proprietary ‘walled garden’ technologies, and 
captive information flows. More than simply offering another channel through which to 
consume, these conditions allow for the establishment of new monopolistic platforms – 
marketplaces in which domestic life integrates with global capital (Langley & Leyshon, 
2017). In providing the machinery necessary for a marketplace, the smart home 
generates the possibility of “colonising” (Couldry & Mejias, 2018) a relatively untouched 
domain of social life: 
Not all – and not even most – of our social interactions are co-opted into a 
system of profit generation […] one of the reasons why companies must compete 
to build platforms is that most of our social interactions do not enter into a 
valorisation process. (Srnicek, 2017, p. 54) 
Google and Amazon occupy a central position in the smart home market thanks 
to their conversational agents. Google’s Assistant and Amazon’s Alexa occupy their 
respective ‘smart speaker’ device (called Home and Echo), and are becoming standard 
features in third-party smart home offerings, integrating them into Google and Amazon’s 
platforms. The platform controller is a gatekeeper, not only managing access to the 
platform – shutting out rivals and ensuring their own services are defaults – but also 
demanding increasing quantities of the data flows between occupants and third-party 
smart devices (Day, 2019). 
For Amazon, the largest e-retailer in the world, control of the smart home 
platform opens up the possibility of ensuring their store is the householders’ default 
source of consumer goods. For Google, the largest advertising company in the world, 
control of the smart home platform means ensuring supremacy for the numerous digital 
services they offer, including searches, video and mapping, and promises in the longer 
term a new means of presenting advertising to users. For both companies, perhaps the 
greatest prize of all is data itself, generated through measurements of both the activities 
of humans and devices throughout the home, and their interactions. Here data’s value is 
two-fold. Firstly, it promises a means of better understanding user preferences and 
intentions, with the goal of directing consumption. Secondly, and increasingly, data has 
value as a resource for ‘machine learning’ – the set of techniques by which many 
advanced automated services, such a conversational agent, are trained. There is a 
virtuous circle here for companies that take a lead in such services – using them to 
capture user data and using that data in turn to improve the capabilities of their 
services. 
Markets require the creation of a sharp ontological distinction between ““things” 
to be valued and the “agencies” capable of valuing them” (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010, p. 
5). We read the smart home to be a project for generating and harnessing this 
distinction, in the form of the platform family. The platform family comprises of both 
‘things’ and ‘agencies’. The latter consists of family members, participating as consumers 
in platform-mediated exchanges. The former is a “pacified” (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010) 
rendering of domestic life in software, done most visibly in the group user accounts we 
study here. Pacification allows for the stabilisation of the object, the disentanglement of 
it from the networks in which it sits, and its subsequent circulation through other 
domains (here, the market hosted on the platform). In other words, the platform family 
is both a vehicle for domestic consumption, and a vehicle for consuming domestic life. In 
its totality, the platform family comprises of an engineered simulacra of domesticity, 
formatted to run on the respective smart home operating system. Our concern here is 
not solely with describing the platform family, but considering how the ontological 
distinction created does not sustain in practice. Rather, the metrics deployed in this 
process act to both make judgments about members of the setting, and change the 
judgements they make about themselves (Beer, 2016). It is this act of pacifying 
domestic life, and its implications for those involved, which we address. 
Sociality is not simply “rendered technological” by moving to [a digital] space; 
rather, coded structures are profoundly altering the nature of our connections, 
creations, and interactions. (van Dijck, 2013, p. 20) 
This paper proceeds by firstly exploring sociological understandings of home and 
family, which we will later contrast with the rendering offered by the platform family. We 
then turn, in Section 4, to describing the group accounts offered by Google and Amazon, 
and then in Section 5 to their implications for domestic life. In doing so, it should be 
noted that we do not address families subject to coercive relationships. IoT technologies 
pose a specific set of challenges in domestic violence contexts, challenges which are just 
beginning to be recognised (Tanczer, Parkin, Danezis, & Patel, 2018), and require their 
own focus. Finally, Section 6 brings the two preceding sections together, to consider the 
specificities of Amazon and Google’s respective pacifications of domestic life. This reveals 
the smart home to be a project of “data colonialism” (Couldry & Mejias, 2018), by which 
the totality of social interaction is sought for capture and commodification. 
 
2. Home and family 
Before addressing group accounts and their designs on domestic life, we first unpack two 
key concepts: family and home. We do not offer an exhaustive history. Instead the 
concern is with two aspects which the platform family perhaps impinges most directly on 
– the contrast between contemporary understandings of what constitutes ‘family’, and 
the functionalist intellectual heritage the platform family parallels; and the conception of 
home as a haven for families, where they might be free of the world beyond its walls. 
These accounts will inform our subsequent dissection of the platform family. 
2.1. Understanding family 
Highlighted here is a shift from conceptualising families as atomistic structures, to 
something far more relational, contested, and dynamic. Functionalist accounts of the 
mid-twentieth century emphasised the modern family of industrialised Western society 
as nuclear, a discrete grouping of individuals within a single household, in which clearly 
defined roles – father, mother, daughter, son – guided social interaction (Burgess & 
Locke, 1945). Parsons (1956) identified family as a key component in the capitalist 
system, specialised for socialising individuals, and providing for their material and 
emotional needs in a stable environment. Roles were ascribed largely by gender, the 
husband in the instrumental role as wage earner, the wife in the affective role of family 
carer (Parsons & Bales, 1956). 
This account has come to be seen as deeply flawed by sociologists studying 
family. It essentialised family according to a white suburban American middle-class ideal 
at the expense of recognising variation, struggle and conflict, in the form of poverty, 
race, class, and gender, the latter being naturalised as deeply unequal (Chambers, 2012, 
p. 22). The focus on how family structures served capitalist production and consumption 
resulted in blind spots such as those of domestic labour which overwhelmingly fell on 
women (Oakley, 1984). Relationships between LGBTQ couples, which even today remain 
outside the recognition of marriage in many societies, were ignored or characterised as 
deviant (Weeks, 1985). 
The heterogeneity of ‘family’, underplayed or ignored in functionalist accounts, 
was – and continues to be – highlighted by empirical accounts. Far from being nuclear, 
families are found enmeshed within extended kinship networks (Young & Willmott, 
1962). Structures vary within and between communities – for example in some, single 
female-headed households are common, positioned within a wider matriarchal kinship 
(Chamberlain, 1999). Highlighting the dynamism of family, divorce is shown to result in 
‘chains of relationships’ extending across multiple households (Smart & Neale, 1998), 
and transnational migration detaches family from co-habitation, stretching it across 
national and continental boundaries (Williams, 2004, Chapter 6). 
The mutability of family roles has also been debated. Giddens (1992) new 
‘democratic’ family, in which personal choice and agency overcame traditional 
determinations of roles, has been accused of lacking empirical basis, by studies pointing 
to ongoing power differentials along lines of gender, generation and class (Jamieson, 
1999; Smart & Neale, 1998), and the ongoing presence of gender-based violence 
(Goldsack, 1999). Nevertheless, more democratic ideals are acknowledged as an 
aspiration amongst partners seeking more equal relationships (Jamieson, 1999, Chapter 
6). 
The shift away from seeing family as a fixed structure of complementary roles is 
perhaps best accommodated by Morgan’s (1996) notion of family as practice, that is as a 
set of doings composing the conduct of everyday life, which are orientated to other 
family members. Membership and practice are co-constitutive – family exists only 
insomuch as it is reflexively performed by its members. In performing family, these 
practices ‘display’ it to both fellow members and to outsiders (Finch, 2007). The outcome 
of these writings is an understanding of family today which emphases diversity and 
fluidity, and which greatly complicates its relationship with a single home as locus. The 
great irony, as we shall see, is that as those studying the family adopt the language of 
digital technologies to describe it as ‘networked’ (Wellman, 2018), the companies behind 
those same technologies are reinventing family according to a functionalist template. 
2.2. Home as autonomous entity 
Stinchcombe (1963) declared the protection from outside interference of small, 
autonomous social systems like the home to be the distinctive feature of the modern 
liberal state (p.151): 
The maintenance of the boundaries of [homes] is necessary to their free and 
autonomous development. If agents of the state or strange private citizens can 
enter these systems arbitrarily and interfere with interaction within them, they 
cannot develop freely. (Stinchcombe, 1963) 
This conception of independent enclave, to be guarded from outside interference, can be 
exampled in the resistance states meet whilst intervening in childrearing practices 
(Bowlby, Gregory, & McKie, 1997). And yet, the performative coding of domestic life by 
external institutions has long been recognised. Religions and states intercede by 
naturalising particular notions of the family unit, historically in the West as the white, 
gendered, heterosexual nuclear family which formed the locus of functionalist accounts, 
as a means of imposing particular social codes amenable to their own interests 
(Wardhaugh, 1999). Exercising these interests extends to entering homes – the 
nineteenth century industrialising state targeted the homes of the poor as spaces in 
which the socialisation of subsequent generations must be policed, lest they be revealed 
as unfit to serve their societal role as workers, or the mothers of workers (Dingwall & 
Robinson, 1990). In early twentieth century Europe, liberal concerns about state 
interference problematised these increasingly organised interventions. In response the 
state medicalised their involvement in domestic management and child care (Donzelot, 
1997). Using the very real threat of disease to justify interventions served to obscure the 
normativity of this work, and diseases’ capacity to inflict suffering across social 
hierarchies allowed for the universalising of this surveillance regime, aiding in its de-
politicisation. 
The subsequent expansion of the state into healthcare and education, and 
relocation of work from home to factory, presented new ways in which domestic life was 
hemmed-in by external forces (Morgan, 2004), whilst simultaneously furthering the idea 
of the home as a haven from them (Hareven, 1991). Despite this status, as homes 
become ever-more socio-materially complex assemblages, through the accumulation of 
appliances, home furnishings, ICTs, the detritus of consumerism, and the conjoined 
rising expectations of comfort and convenience (Shove, 2003), the formal standards and 
categories embedded in those objects have in their own myriad, often imperceptible, 
ways come to ‘torque’ domestic social orders, twisting them into new forms (Bowker & 
Star, 2000). This is done through the selective identification of groupings, and the 
prescription of relations between them, the salience of which we shall see in Section 4. 
Akrich (1992) refers to this process as ‘scripting’, in which designers configure their 
technology with a particular representation of user and setting in mind, which is then 
materialised in the technology. Much of the power of these representations lies in their 
invisibility to the user – just as early twentieth century European states presented their 
domestic interventions as the objective necessity of protecting public health, technology 
scripts’ political efficacy is in part due their being hidden within the ostensible purposes 
of the object (Marres, 2010). In this manner the technologies which surround us form an 
invisible “built moral environment” (Bowker & Star, 2000, p. 326), their designs enabling 
some actions and prescribing others, surfacing some categories and erasing others. It is 
the obfuscation of their political goals which allows their shaping and reshaping of the 
home to progress without triggering coordinated resistance. 
Resistance has many forms however, from outright rejection, to a far more subtle 
process of reauthoring designers’ intentions. Whilst platform families seek to script the 
doing of family, Akrich (1992) does not claim technological determinism, but rather an 
exchange between designer and user. In practice, smart home technologies are being, 
will be, co-produced in the process of ‘domestication’ (Silverstone & Hirsch, 1994). Users 
might, presented with the constrictions imposed by platform families, refuse to adopt 
them in sufficient numbers, necessitating redesign. Alternatively, every system has its 
seams, where intentions might be unravelled by the curious or the subversive, 
restrictions circumvented. Users may apply technologies to applications the designers 
never imagined. Exploring such domestication processes is a step beyond our focus here, 
however. Partly this is because there is value in simply understanding the designs of 
these systems for what they reveal of the designer’s intentions. Secondly, these 
technologies are still in-the-making, and yet to be widely embedded in everyday life, at 
least in the comprehensive manner imagined by the smart home vision. We take a 
deliberately anticipatory orientation towards a class of socio-technical conditions 
intended by their designers to become as ubiquitous in everyday life as the smartphone 
and social media are today. In addressing these systems as nascent constructions, we 
follow Urry’s (2016) call to address the future, being “too important to be left to states, 
corporations or technologists” (p.7). 
 
3. Methods 
The material used in this paper was collected from Amazon and Google websites and 
apps in summer 2018. The goal was to generate descriptive accounts of the features of 
Household and Families, using the same information available to users of those services. 
Accordingly, all text from the Support sections of relevant websites and apps were 
gathered and analysed. Coding was limited to identifying and categorising these 
‘features’, which consisted of described account roles, relationships, and their collective 
and individual affordances and restrictions. Key features are presented in Table 1. This 
material was not inconsiderable and distributed across multiple service and device 
specific pages – for example for Household this amounted to over 2000 words spread 
across multiple webpages, including on both the Amazon website, and Alexa app. Even 
then aspects remained obscured – for example no explicit statement on the possibility of 
a Household consisting of members registered in different countries was found. In cases 
such as this information was sought on official help forums, and where possible tests 
were conducted by creating dummy group accounts using multiple email addresses. 
Limiting ourselves to information available to users was a practical measure – we have 
no privileged access to the designers of these services – but it also served place us in 
the same position as those using the systems. The difficulty in establishing precisely the 
affordances and constraints of platform families is salient to this paper’s broader concern 
for how the local agency is constrained by the adoption of these systems. 
Table 1. Description of group account roles and their key features. 
Account Age Notable features 
Amazon Household 
Adult (max 2 
members) 
18+ (20+ in Japan)  Control over Teen and Child 
accounts as listed below. 
 If two Adults then must share 
payment details, else content 
sharing between them disabled. 
 Either Adult may remove the 
other Adult, or any other 
member, from the Household 
group. 
Teen (max 4 
members) 
13–17 (13–19 in Japan)  Able to access shared content 
libraries and make purchases 
from Amazon store subject to 
Family Manager or Parent 
approval. 
Child (max 4 
members) 
−13  Able to access shared content 
libraries subject to Family 
Manager or Parent approval. 
 Cannot make purchases from 
Amazon store. 
 Subject to both controls over time 
of use, and some goal-setting for 
certain content. 





18+ (20+ in Japan)  Control over Parent and Family 
Member accounts as listed below. 
 If also a parent in the Family then 
must share payment details with 
them. 
 May remove Parent or any other 
member from the Families group. 
Parent (max 1 
member) 
18+ (20+ in Japan)  Control over Family Member 





No age requirements attached, but 
if under age 13 Family Link 
required, which gives all executive 
account controls to a Parent or 
Family Manager. 
 Able to access shared content 
libraries and make purchases 
from Google stores subject to 
Family Manager or Parent 
approval. 
 Able to make purchases 
independent of Parent or Family 
Manager if using own payment 
option, and control whether or 
not purchase is shared. 
 Subject to controls over time of 
use if Family Link enabled. 
 
4. Family accounts 
Amazon Household and Google Families are presented as tools for sharing digital content 
and coordinating activities, complementing the smart home hardware within both 
companies’ ecosystems. Their intentioned application within families is made explicit in 
their straplines: “Share the things you love about Amazon with your family” (Amazon 
Household), “Share entertainment and stay connected with the ones you love” (Google 
Families). They support an ecology in which users might conduct multiple family 
practices without ever leaving the platform. We separate these practices into two 
groups: the shared consumption of media; and the coordination of everyday activities, 
via the management of both fellow members and networked devices. In contrast to 
comparable technologies like smartphones and laptops which are paradigmatically 
designed for personal computing, with content and control locked to individual user 
accounts, Household and Families ostensibly enable these activities to be performed 
socially, as coordinated or shared experiences between the members of small groups. 
They can then be read as a recognition of the fundamentally social character of the 
action both enabled, and tracked, by IoT technologies embedded within homes (Goulden 
et al., 2018). 
Both Families and Household operate as a scaffold of interlinked accounts. 
Amazon separates Household into three roles, corresponding to age: Adults (18–), Teens 
(13–17), Children (–13)1. It may include ten members – two Adults, four Teens and four 
Children. Google Families are smaller, limited to six members. Families also consist of 
three roles, comprising one Family Manager, one Parent, and up to four Family Members. 
In both sets of accounts, different roles come with different affordances, and 
relationships with other roles, generating a hierarchy represented in Figure 1. As is 
readily apparent in the language used, the accounts purposefully associate themselves 
with family and home. 
Figure 1. Representation of families and household account structures. 
 
Addressing sharing firstly, within both Families and Household, sharing digital 
content can only take place between adult accounts which have first shared payment 
options. The credit card serves as the metric of intimacy for the platform, identifying a 
legitimate family by the willingness of its adults to trust one another with access to their 
finances. 
Enabling the sharing of digital goods – both Amazon and Google now sell films, 
TV shows, books, music, and apps – can be read as an inducement to households who 
have established expectations of sharing based on the affordances of physical media. 
CDs, LPs, DVDs, paper books – all allow for unconstrained informal sharing, and can 
                                           
1 At the time of writing, the Amazon Household discussed here is only available to users 
of amazon.com, the US site. Users in other territories are presented with a somewhat 
different family structure, in which the Teen role does not exist. Instead, there is simply 
two Adults and four Children. It is assumed that the Teen role, and associated app, is 
intended appear in other territories in due course. 
circulate within families, whether as ‘hand-me-downs’ from older to younger members, 
recommendations, or (unsanctioned) ‘borrowing’. As digital content, such media are 
increasingly only legally available with Digital Rights Management (DRM) embedded in 
them – code which ties them to the sellers’ platform and its restrictions, in doing so 
modifying the possibilities for ‘fair use’ (Postigo, 2012). As a result, performing 
historically-common domestic sharing practices now requires – for digital goods – the 
adoption of a group account in order to circumvent restrictions imposed by the platform 
itself. Within-group sharing can be understood as a practical demonstration of the doing 
of family which contributes meaning – as altruistic, mutual, supportive, socialising – to 
it. The sharing functions of these accounts reconfigure a means of being family, to one in 
which Google or Amazon is now intermediary. 
The second group of practices concern domestic organisation, in the form of 
control of other household members, and household objects. The integration of the latter 
with group accounts remains, at the time of writing, a work in progress, reflecting how 
inchoate the smart home project remains. There are though concrete developments – 
Google Assistant, for example, can recognise up to six (matching the size of Families) 
individual voices and assign them to their correct user account, allowing personalised 
control of shared devices. It is currently control over fellow household members that 
forms the focus of group accounts. Both Household and Families assume hierarchical 
relationships between different role accounts. Amazon’s Adult accounts can control what 
media and apps Child accounts can access, view their browsing history, set time limits 
on account use, and set ‘educational goals’ – gamification mechanics which set targets 
for book pages to be read, and reward compliance with Achievement badges (this 
instrumentalist reimagining of the “joy of reading” a particularly brutish demonstration of 
the neoliberal rationalities of metricisation at work here (Beer, 2016)). As with sharing 
practices above, the platform simultaneously ruptures existing practices – here by 
supporting frictionless, pervasive access to almost-limitless digital content for adults and 
children alike – and offers a solution for that rupture which serves to embed the platform 
further into family life – here by offering the former tools to control the latter’s access. 
Google’s Families works similarly, with Parent and Family Manager able to view 
purchases made by Family Members, and exercise control over their purchases, should 
they wish. More fine-grained control over these accounts is available here too, but 
through a separate feature called Family Link. Effectively, Family Link turns a Family 
Member account into the equivalent of Amazon’s Children account. 
Over and above these controls, there are executive functions relating to both 
certain accounts and the group in its entirety. These are the controls that adult account 
members hold over both dependants and their partner. Within Household, both Adults 
hold the agency to remove their partner, and remove or add new Children or Teen 
accounts. Families takes a different structure, as reflected by Figure 1. Here the Family 
Manager alone holds the capacity for executive actions. In Google’s own terminology, 
these include “Decide who is in the family group”, and “Delete the family group” (Google, 
2018). A summary of these roles and their notable features is given in Table 1. 
Finally, there are platform-specific offerings. Household offers a service through 
which users on a Teen account can make purchases from the Amazon store through a 
dedicated Teen app. This uses the Household’s shared payment option (which is to say, 
one nominated by an Adult account), but only with Adult oversight, who must sanction 
any purchases (see Figure 2). Google offers shared calendars, and a service called Keep 
which acts like a digital family pinboard. These offerings reflect Google’s reliance on 
selling advertising driven by data generated by informational and organisational tools 
(e.g., Search, Maps, Gmail) which are free at the point of use. 
Figure 2. Excerpts from amazon advertisement for teen accounts. 
 
 
5. Implications for domestic life 
The systems described above capture a swathe of domestic life within their platform 
infrastructure. This capture entails a reconfiguration of these practices – and a 
reconfiguration of the families conducting them – in the form of the platform family. In 
this section we consider the detail of this reconfiguration, drawing on Morgan’s (2004) 
typology of everyday life to do so. By way of example, we focus on one aspect of family 
accounts: leaving and joining, which we contrast with the everyday maintenance and 
redrawing of family boundaries. 
Morgan (2004) approaches family not as abstract structure but instead as an idea 
applied by self-identified members “in the very process of shaping family life itself” 
(p.38). ‘Life’ here takes three intertwined forms – ‘life events’; ‘life’s regularities’; and 
‘normative life’ (pp. 37–38) – which between them constitute family as experienced by 
its members. We use this typology to highlight just a few ways in which family accounts 
reimagine domestic life. 
‘Life events’ are non-routine features of family experience, major life-course 
experiences in which families are formed and reformed, including birth, death, marriage 
and divorce. ‘Life’s regularities’ concerns the quotidian and mundane – these might 
include meal times, the school run, the Friday night film, chores. Finally, ‘normative life’ 
concerns the ideas the family attaches to itself and its activities, which define ‘normal’. 
Their overlapping nature should be stressed – so the conduct of everyday doings serves 
to normalise such activities in the simple fact of their repetition, whilst the normative 
understandings of such activities legitimate them and so safeguard their ongoing 
enactment. 
We focus in the following section on co-located nuclear families, but only as the 
form platform families are designed for. For other intimate groupings, the platforms’ 
intervention is unlikely to be any less jarring. 
 
5.1. Leaving/joining the platform family 
Within Household, both Parent accounts have the agency to remove the partnered 
account. Once removed, an individual is effectively vanished from the digital enactment 
of the group. They have no recourse to their removal and lose parental controls over any 
Teen or Child accounts within the family. Content remains with the purchaser, regardless 
of which Parent the shared payment option belonged to. Family photos and other user-
generated content become only available to the original uploader. Furthermore, one 
cannot be a member of more than one Household at a time, and upon leaving/being 
ejected from a Household, one may not join another for 180 days. In Google Families, 
only the Family Manager holds the power to remove others. Again, membership is 
exclusive to one Family at a time, and here one must wait 360 days before joining a 
different Family. A further restriction on both services is that families must reside within 
the same country to use many of the benefits offered. 
In shearing another adult from the symbolic and practical attachments to home 
and family which are served by group accounts, a separation is performed which can be 
read to signify a relationship breakup, ejection from the shared home, and potentially – 
in the case of marriage – divorce. These are life events, in Morgan’s (2004) typology, 
but with disruption to membership they also carry profound implications for life’s 
regularities, which may abruptly become highly irregular, before a new normal is 
established. Extracting oneself from the site of a long-term relationship is a complex 
process of unravelling affective, practical and material entanglements (Vaughan, 1990). 
The role of possessions in breakups is knotty – for the initiating party, objects which 
symbolise the relationship are rejected, at least in the short term, but for the partner, 
“[h]e or she not only covets objects that symbolise the initiator and the relationship, but 
may devote increased time and energy in them” (p. 133). The maintenance of ties 
between child and parent through life’s regularities is likely to be particularly fraught at 
this time. The experience of break up is commonly one of chaos (p.188), and even those 
patterns which are discernible are subject to variation, as well as reversal: “though a 
given relationship has progressed through many phases of uncoupling, the process can 
be interrupted at any time” (pp. 190–191). 
Separation within the platform family looks very different. Ejection from the 
family group is instantaneous and final, involving entering a password, and clicking 
‘Remove’. All previously shared material is automatically reallocated according to the 
criteria given above. Of course, material goods still need allocating, and emotional and 
practical entanglements remain, but increasingly the latter – particularly family leisure 
and organisational practices – are enmeshed in these systems via shared media and 
calendars etcetera. A richly meaningful set of entanglements, through which both family 
and post-family life are enacted, is here reconstituted, with the platform intermediating. 
Third party mediation of family separation is not novel. Divorce allows the state 
to both legally mark the dissolution of marriage, and police its possibilities. The form this 
takes varies, marking political struggles between different interest groups seeking to 
impose their own rendering of family life (Hasson, 2006), but commonly the process 
allows for the distribution of resources and obligations according to criteria of assessed 
future need and/or past conduct. By contrast, within Household, ejection is decided 
simply by whichever Parent clicks first; within Families, whichever individual created the 
original Family Manager account is invested with ultimate power forevermore. The 
redistribution of resources is pre-determined, and no social obligations are recognised. 
Members of the platform family are offered automated disentanglement, in which 
affective and practical ties are unpicked as effortlessly as a commercial subscription 
might be. 
This surgical separation offered by the platform’s intermediation is particularly 
striking when children are involved. The organisation of co-parenting is a central element 
of post-divorce life, something often formally recognised by state interventions which 
specifically define divorce as the end of marriage, not of parenting (Chambers, 2012, pp. 
82–83). The platform family allows no distinction here: as connections to ex-partners are 
severed, so too are those to the children. 
We make these comparisons to highlight the specificity of the platforms’ 
intervention into domestic life. The contrast demonstrates that at the moment of 
relationship breakdown, the social paradigm – in which family accounts are designed to 
enable shared practices – reverts to one of personal computing – in which the sovereign 
consumer exercises control, free of accountability to others, awarded fiefdom to delete 
the family. This model transgresses the norms of reciprocal obligations which marriage 
merely formalises between committed relationship partners and does so by 
commoditising family as a product like any other. The long-term implications for 
normative family life are unknowable, but it is already clear that the platform family 
brings with it very practical consequences for life’s events and regularities. 
 
6. Discussion: platform families 
The history of the home as a space apart from the world beyond its walls is a complex 
one. Stinchcombe’s (1963) work highlights the distinct status of the home within liberal 
societies, and this remains recognised in contemporary legislation like GDPR and its 
household exemption clause. Yet external institutions do leave their marks on life inside 
the home’s walls. Amazon and Google’s efforts can be read as a continuation of this, and 
like nation states and organised religions before them, their imagining of domestic life is 
in service to their institutional interests. 
These interests can be seen in their particular formulations. When compared with 
those past interventions, one notable absence from Household and Families is an overt 
heteronormative gendering of roles. In use, neither platform’s family structure attaches 
sex, gender or ethnicity to any role or affordance. They are agnostic in this sense, 
though in placing a particular set of devices at the heart of family, the gendering of 
those devices becomes salient. If Google’s Family Manager derives ultimate authority 
from being the first adopter in the family, the fact that the associated technologies are 
designed by and for men (Oudshoorn, Rommes, & Stienstra, 2004), or more specifically 
‘Resource Man’ (Strengers, 2014), has deep implications for how agency is distributed 
within the platform family. (Ironically, one consequence of broader adoption of these 
systems may be an increase in male domestic labour, as the family member most likely 
to be tasked with maintaining technical systems (Strengers & Nicholls, 2018). 
Applying such categories to users would be counter-productive for the platform’s 
logic – pacification calls for the homogenisation of a universal unit of exchange. The 
network effects the platform leverages is are in part dependant on the vast economies of 
scale it derives from negating territorial difference through the application of 
transnational standards. The only deference to localism detectable in Families or 
Household from the information they provide lies in their classification of Japanese 
Adults as aged 20 or older. Here they bend to the idiosyncrasies of Japanese law, which 
allows for voting from the age of 18, but only allows for credit cards to be held from the 
age of 20. 
This metric offers a blunt declaration of the commercial interests informing these 
designs. The totem at the heart of both Families and Households is the shared credit 
card. Adulthood here is established by initiation into the financial system, and intimacy 
by shared participation in it. Rendering this requirement, the metric of intimacy serves 
distinct purposes in establishing group boundaries. For those counted within it, it 
establishes consumption at the centre of platform family practices. For those the 
platform operators wish to exclude, namely non-intimate groups seeking to share media 
content, it serves as a demonstration of mutual trust which those entering into these 
groups must perform. 
By inserting itself within domestic practices, by capturing material and symbolic 
elements of it, the platform family seeks to supplant social forms which currently lie 
outside their valorisation systems. Accordingly, consumerism is awarded primary 
position in this new form of doing family. Bauman’s (1987) fears that – through 
consumerism – intimate social interactions are supplanted by signalling via consumer 
goods appears realised by the advertising of Amazon Household shown in Figure 2. Here 
the entirety of the interaction between mother and son takes place through the platform, 
in the act of negotiating the purchase of shoes. In the associated branding, Amazon 
celebrates such interactions between parent and child as ‘teachable moments’ (Amazon, 
2018). 
The influence of business model extends deeper, to the conceptualisation of 
family itself. In defining both a single site and formal roles, Amazon’s ‘Household’, with 
its two ‘parents’ and up to eight ‘children’, has echoes of the functionalist accounts of the 
archetypal nuclear family. Google’s offering is slightly different – its Family Member role 
is more flexible than Amazon’s Teen and Children, in not presuming (pre)adolescence. 
Kin here is undefined. This difference is revealing of the platform builder conceptualising 
family through the prism of their business model. Amazon – its core consumer-facing 
business the delivery of physical goods to the home – renders home as a single site 
occupied by the nuclear family. For Google, delivering advertising and extracting data 
through their organisational and communication tools, family is a potentially dispersed 
(within territorial boundaries) kinship network. 
Where local difference implicates the profitability of the platform, its structuring 
of domestic life becomes unyielding. Given the threat in-group sharing potentially carries 
for product sales, there is a clear interest for platform operators to limit its scope. This 
provides a rationale for the restriction that any member can only reside in one size-
limited family at a time – never mind that separated families are a common occurrence 
in contemporary western societies, or that in minority cultures particularly, family may 
consist of tight-knit kinship groups much larger than the six or ten members allowed. 
Other non-nuclear families are similarly marginalised. Transnational or migrant families, 
in which members occupy different territories, are in many cases simply proscribed by 
both platforms. The assumption of two parents in the nuclear family template is also 
more ill-fitting for some cultures than others. In some, single parent households are 
common (Chamberlain, 1999). This is accommodated by both platforms, but such 
households’ tendency towards larger, matrifocal kinship networks of parental figures, in 
place of the nuclear couple, is not. 
Bowker and Star (2000) direct our attention to the moral agency that operates 
within seemingly sterile information infrastructures: 
To classify is human […] We all spend large parts of our days doing classification 
work, often tacitly. [But] each standard and each category valorizes some point 
of view and silences another. This is not inherently a bad thing – indeed it is 
inescapable. But it is an ethical choice, and as such it is dangerous – not bad, but 
dangerous. (pp. 5–6) 
Amazon and Google’s group accounts offer an ontology of family, defining structures, 
identities and roles – the most fundamental of group features. Ontologies are not simply 
isolated accounts of phenomena but are in themselves performative (Law, 2009). 
Shaping the ethical choices taken are the commercial interests of the platform operator. 
In the particular formations of family which the platform valorises, it is normalised as 
being of a certain size, as co-located, as isolated, and as stable and enduring, in which 
authority over others is formally vested in one, or perhaps two, key roles. In these 
aspects the platform family comes to resemble the nuclear family of mid-twentieth 
century suburban America idealised by Parsons (1956). Encoded into the software 
running on the home’s networked objects, the platform’s ontology is also realised as a 
material infrastructure which shapes both life events and everyday regularities. 
Transnational or migrant families, spread across nations and continents, are simply 
excluded. For those who are allowed to digitally consummate their family, their practices 
which become incorporated by the platform are subject to its commercial and legal 
frameworks. 
Finch (2007) draws attention to how the ‘display’ of doing family is itself 
important, meaning the shared participation in recognised family activities which signal 
to both participants, and those observing, that the group are a family. This is particularly 
so during moments in which family structures and roles are in flux, such as when a child 
moves out of the family home, or a new parental figure joins the family. At such times, a 
statement of the group’s contours, through public appeal to normative understandings of 
family, can aid in stabilising the group for its members. The platform family offers such 
opportunities, yet its restrictions constrain display, limiting who can join, when, and 
under what circumstances. Regardless of their own experience, those cast out from the 
platform family must remain in the wilderness for 180 days, or a year, depending on 
platform operator. Children or adults finding themselves, through family separation and 
reformation, in ‘chains of relationships’ (Smart & Neale, 1998), must chose the one 
which will be their sole digital home. 
The platform requires that family must be rendered such that it is both encodable 
within digital systems, and commensurate with the platform’s commercial logics. This 
requires the informal, situated orderings of domestic life, which allow for family to take a 
near-infinite variety of forms in order to endure the changing relational circumstances of 
members, be formalised in its structure and codified in its rules. This formalism is, in 
contrast to past interventions in the home, not determined by any explicitly normative 
programme, but rather by the mechanisms of the market which the platform captures 
the family within. The purposive design nevertheless leads the platform family to be 
understood as a form in the service not of its members but of industrial society. 
Accordingly, it both echoes Parson’s nuclear family in conception and shares its failings, 
in favouring homogeneity over the diversity and fluidity of families as they are 
experienced by members. Parson’s work, however, was intended as merely descriptive – 
the platform family is prescriptive. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The overtly technological nature of the smart home project risks blinding us to the socio-
political implications of it (Marres, 2010). Google and Amazon’s family accounts are 
presented as allowing for the integration of digital technologies into domestic structures. 
We suggest they are better understood as allowing for the integration of domestic 
structures into platform capitalism, in the form of the platform family. This is achieved 
through tools which camouflage themselves in the language of family and home, and sell 
a vision of user empowerment, but which in many respects act simply to (partially) solve 
constraints that they themselves impose – constrictions of the market they serve. 
We began by arguing that the platform family generates two forms – the family 
as consumer, ‘agencies’ (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010) of the market; and the rendered 
family, as ‘thing’ to be valued and exchanged. The market these forms serve relies on 
their distinction, but we demonstrate how the ontologies of Google and Amazon’s family 
accounts are performative, repeatedly passing back and forth across this divide. As such, 
the platform family exerts tensions on the two conceptualisations we highlight in Section 
2: the home as haven from external interference; and the family as nexus of relational 
practices, rather than purposive structure. Google and Amazon offer a technical, yet 
inevitably normative, account of what home is, and family does. As scripts, these 
categorisations carry material force – creating new possibilities for life’s regularities, 
events and norms, whilst precluding others. In arguing for conceptualising contemporary 
capitalism as data colonialism, Couldry and Mejias (2018, p. 11) highlight Quijano’s 
(2007) description of historical colonialism, specifically its efforts to erase cultural 
heterogeneity, and impose a single reality. The smart home, and the code running 
through it, can be read as such – as not merely a landgrab, but a concerted effort to 
rewrite the lives situated within it, such that they are permanently in the service of the 
platform and its generation of surplus value. 
This paper, and the identification of platform families, raises questions for future 
work, the most pressing of which is the forms resistance to this project might take. How 
might heterogeneity be recovered from the pacification (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010) of the 
platform? There are undoubtedly many seams in these systems – for example, the 
reliance on email accounts for identification is crude and open to manipulations – and 
the recent travails of Facebook, now under growing regulatory pressure, point to a 
changing political environment, in which more organised resistance is possible. Certainly, 
the almost aggressively transgressive nature of particular elements of the platform 
family create conditions ripe for the kind of moral panics social media platforms are 
currently being swamped by. First and foremost, however, civil society needs to 
recognise the (un)ethical project embedded in this ‘built moral environment’. Academia 
has a part to play here: great attention has been given to the privacy implications of the 
smart home, and IoT more broadly, but this surveillance lens has a tendency to overlook 
the lived experience of these technologies, and the consequences therein. More light 
needs to be shone here. 
Thoughts of resistance also prompt questions of the lived experiences of 
inhabiting the platform family. Ironically, whilst the platforms adopt a functionalist 
account of family in order to capture its value-generating, it is the doings of family 
practices where that value creation – as defined by members – actually takes place. The 
informality of the family as a social system gives it its institutional durability, but it also 
spawns the heterogeneity, the dynamism, which the market cannot allow of the objects 
it trades in. Are then the colonial ambitions of the platform builders ultimately self-
defeating? And how do these tensions play out for those living within the platform 
family? Given the heterogeneity of these groups, how do the prescriptions of the 
platform family play out across their different forms? 
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